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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND
THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
AS LIMITATIONS ON THE NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S
RIGHT TO INVESTIGATE AIR TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS
TERRY D. RAGSDALE
I. INTRODUCTION
THE AIR FORCE parajumper team aboard an HC-130
rescue plane had been following the flight of the sin-
gle-engine Cessna 210 Centurion for well over an hour.'
The rescue plane was part of a military convoy that had
been scrambled to intercept the Cessna after the plane's
pilot had radioed the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) in Virginia, complaining of chest pains and diffi-
culty in breathing. 2 Since the Air Force had been unable
to establish radio contact with the apparently unconscious
pilot for over four hours, the parajumper/medic team was
not surprised to see the Cessna eventually run out of gas
and begin to spiral sharply toward the Atlantic Ocean
near the Bahamian island of Eleuthera. The team was sur-
prised, however, to see the pilot escape from the rapidly
sinking plane. Dropping a raft, the medics parachuted
into the ocean and rescued the pilot, who had suffered a
piercing abdominal wound.4 Fascinating media reports
' James S. Kunen, et al., Flying Straight into Trouble, PEOPLE WKLY., July 31,
1989, at 20, 21; George J. Church & Bruce Henderson, A Bizarre and Suspicious
Flight, TIME, July 24, 1989, at 21.
2 Church, supra note 1, at 21.
. Id.
4 Kunen, supra note 1, at 21.
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exposed the nation to the gripping saga of Thomas L.
Root, the "mystery" pilot.
At Memorial Hospital in Hollywood, Florida, surgeons
discovered that Root's abdominal wound had been caused
by a bullet.5 Media reports soon revealed that Root, a
Washington, D.C. communications attorney, was under
numerous criminal investigations, 6 and many speculated
that Root's mystery flight was, in fact, a failed suicide at-
tempt. 7 After a psychiatrist interviewed Root at Memorial
Hospital, Root publicly denied the allegations of suicide
and suggested that a revolver in the cockpit must have ac-
cidentally discharged when the plane crashed.8
During its investigation of the airplane accident, the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued a sub-
poena to the Hollywood Memorial Hospital seeking
Root's medical records. 9 The hospital complied with the
request, except as to Root's psychiatric records.' 0 The
NTSB sought enforcement of the subpoena in federal dis-
trict court and moved for judgment on the pleadings."I In
response, Root intervened and moved for judgment on
the pleadings and to quash the subpoena on the grounds
that the psychiatric records were protected by a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege or the constitutional right to
privacy. Apparently holding that the psychiatric-patient
communications were worthy of protection under either a
federal common law privilege or the constitutional right
to privacy, the district court granted Root's motion to
5Id.
6 Id. at 22. Several states were investigating Root for securities fraud, and the
U.S. Customs Service was investigating Root for possible drug running. Id.
7 Id. at 21. Hollywood Police Chief Richard Witt stated that "[p]owder burns
indicate that this was a contact wound .... The gun was either held against or
very close to the body." Id.
8 Sequels, PEOPLE WKLY., December 25, 1989, at 111, 112; Kunen, supra note 1,
at 21.
11 NTSB v. Hollywood Memorial Hosp., 735 F. Supp. 423, 423 (S.D. Fla. 1990),
appeal dismissed, 933 F.2d 1021 (11 th Cir. 1991).
i" 735 F. Supp. at 423.
Id.
12 Id.
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quash the subpoena.13
National Transportation Safety Board v. Hollywood Memorial
Hospital 14 raises two uniquely important questions: (1)
whether under federal common law a psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege insulates a pilot's post-crash psychotherapy
records from the NTSB's access to data needed to deter-
mine probable cause of an air accident and, (2) assuming
that a psychotherapist-patient privilege does not exist,
whether a constitutional right to privacy nevertheless pro-
tects such communications.
This comment attempts to answer these questions first
by reviewing the NTSB's right to investigate air accidents
from a historical perspective. Discussion then turns to
current limitations on the NTSB's right to investigate air
accidents, which ostensibly include statutory limitations,
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, and the constitu-
tional right to privacy. 15
- Id. at 424-25. Post-crash, Root's once soaring career has mirrored his fateful
flight. News reports revealed Root's association with Georgia-based Sonrise Man-
agement Services, organizer of more than 160 partnerships, most of which Root
represented in their licensing applications for Christian radio stations. Jury Indicts
Thomas Root for Fraud, 118 BROADCASTING, March 26, 1990, at 42; Kunen, supra
note 1, at 21. Even though Sonrise took in approximately $14 million in four
years, Root admitted that Sonrise had won less than five licenses for its clients.
Kunen, supra note 1, at 21. On June 5, 1990, Root pleaded guilty to five federal
counts of forgery and fraud arising from his representation of clients before the
Federal Communications Commission. As a result of the plea, Root faced a maxi-
mum fine of $1.25 million and a maximum sentence of thirty-five years. David
Johnston, Lawyer in Plane Crash Pleads Guilty to Forgery, N.Y. TIMES,June 6, 1990, at
A16. The day before pleading guilty to the federal counts, Root and others had
been indicted by a North Carolina county grand jury with 2,695 counts of securi-
ties fraud, deceptive trade practices, and conspiracy to commit fraud. Id. If con-
victed, Root could face more than 1500 years of imprisonment. Id. On the same
day, the United States Supreme Court set into motion disbarment proceedings
against Root. In re Disbarment of Thomas Lawrence Root, 110 S. Ct. 2582
(1990).
,4 735 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
is This comment does not purport to address every conceivable limitation on
the National Transportation Safety Board's right to investigate air accidents. As
the title suggests, the scope of this comment is restricted primarily to the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege and the constitutional right to privacy.
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II. NTSB'S RIGHT To INVESTIGATE AIR ACCIDENTS
The right of the National Transportation Safety Board
to investigate air accidents traces its roots as far back as
the notorious air crash that took the lives of Oklahoma
humorist Will Rogers and aviation pioneer Wiley Post in
1935.' n After briefly tracing the history of the federal
government's involvement in air accident investigation,
existing statutes authorizing the NTSB's investigatory
powers are examined.
A. History of Civil Aviation Accident Investigation Process '7
The Air Commerce Act of 192618 constituted the first
federal civil aviation law in the United States.' 9 The Act
authorized the Secretary of Air Commerce, under the Sec-
retary of Commerce, to "investigate, record and make
public the causes of accidents in civil air navigation. 20
Modifications to the Air Commerce Act in the mid- 1930's
resulted in enhanced investigatory powers, including au-
thorization to subpoena witnesses 2' and creation of an ac-
cident investigation panel.22
16 C.O. Miller, Aviation Accident Investigation: Functional and Legal Perspectives, 46J.
AIR L. & CoM. 237, 239 (1981). Mr. Miller formerly served as the Director of the
Bureau of Aviation Safety under the National Transportation Safety Board. Id. at
237.
" See generally id. (comprehensive history of legislation bearing upon aviation
accident investigation).
1" Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926) (repealed 1958).
Miller, supra note 16, at 238.
20 Pub. L. No. 69-254 § 2(e), 44 Stat. 568, 569 (1926) (repealed 1938).
2 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926), amended
by Pub. L. No. 73-418, 48 Stat. 1113 (1934) (repealed 1938). Miller summarized
the amendments as follows:
The Secretary of Commerce was specifically authorized to hold pub-
lic hearings to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding
aircraft accidents, to subpoena and to examine witnesses and docu-
ments, and to make public statements regarding the causes of the
accidents. The amendments to the Act also prohibited use of the
Secretary's reports in any suit or action arising from any accident.
Miller, supra note 16, at 239 (footnotes omitted).
22 Civil Air Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 91.0-.37 (1939). See also Roy T. Atwood,
Comment, Admissibility of National Transportation Safety Board Reports in Civil Air Crash
Litigation, 53J. AIR L. & CoM. 469, 471 (1987). Creation of the five-member acci-
dent investigation board within the Department of Commerce coincided with pro-
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Overhauls in federal civil aviation law have often been
precipitated by high profile air accidents. The Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938,23 enacted subsequent to the separate
1935 plane crashes that took the lives of Rogers and Post
as well as Senator Bronson M. Cutting of New Mexico,
exemplifies this fact.24 In addition to partially repealing
the Air Commerce Act and creating the Civil Aeronautics
Authority, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 created an
independent Air Safety Board charged with the functions
of investigating air accidents to determine probable cause
and making recommendations to prevent future acci-
dents.25 The weakness of the Air Safety Board quickly be-
came apparent: the Board had no power to implement
safety rules based upon its recommendations.2 6 Thus, by
1940, two separate agencies had been created, the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Civil Aeronautics Ad-
ministration (CAA). 2 7 The investigatory powers of the
abolished Air Safety Board were assigned to the Bureau of
Safety within an independent CAB. 28 This scheme func-
tioned until 1958.29
After World War II, aviation burgeoned in the United
States. Two major accidents in 1958, each involving mili-
tary and civil aircraft, 30 mobilized public and Congres-
sional attention and resulted in the Federal Aviation Act
mulgation of "administrative regulations establishing procedures for aviation
accident investigation." Miller, supra note 16, at 239.
23 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (re-
pealed 1958).
2 Miller, supra note 16, at 239-40.
25 Id. at 240.
26 Id. at 241.
27 Atwood, supra note 22, at 472.
28 Miller, supra note 16, at 241. The CAB also assumed the civil aviation rule-
making function. Id. at 241-42.
20 Id. at 242.
- Id. at 243.
[O]n April 21, 1958, a United States Air Force F100 collided with a
United Airlines DC-7 near Las Vegas, Nevada, killing the two mili-
tary pilots and forty-seven persons aboard the transport. A month
later a National Guard T33 collided with a Capital Airline Viscount
outside Washington, D.C., killing eleven occupants of the Viscount.
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of 1958." The 1958 Act, inter alia, assigned investigatory
powers to the CAB to determine the probable cause of air
accidents, 32 while retaining a prohibition against admit-
ting CAB reports as evidence in civil actions. 3
The next organizational shift in the area of civil aviation
accident investigation was a consequence of the Depart-
ment of Transporation (DOT) Act of 1966.34 The 1966
Act, a congressional response to an ever growing airline
industry, placed investigation of aviation accidents within
the domain of the Bureau of Aviation Safety (BAS) under
the newly created National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB).35
Conflicts between the DOT, the FAA, and the NTSB
culminated in the Independent Safety Board Act of
1974.36 The 1974 Act completely reorganized the NTSB,
including replacement of the Bureau of Aviation Safety
with the Aviation Accident Division. 37 The major substan-
tive change of the 1974 Act established the NTSB as an
independent agency, completely separate from the DOT
and the FAA.3 8 Section 1441 (a) of the Act broadly deline-
ated the NTSB's responsibilities, which included the pro-
mulgation of rules and regulations attendant to accident
" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codi-
fied as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (1988)).
-12 Id. § 701; Atwood, supra note 22, at 472. To facilitate performance of its
exclusive responsibility to issue rules and regulations regarding air safety and air
accident investigation, the CAB was authorized to solicit assistance from the FAA
and other governmental agencies. Miller, supra note 16, at 244. In contrast, the
CAB steadfastly retained its task of determining the probable cause of all acci-
dents, even when the investigation had been delegated to the FAA. Id.
3.1 Atwood, supra note 22, at 473-74. Congress apparently included the prohibi-
tion against admission of CAB reports into evidence in suits arising out of the
accident "to insure that CAB reports would not supplant the role of judge andjury in determining the cause of accidents and encourage accurate and unencum-
bered investigation." Id.
14 Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931
(1966) (substantially repealed 1983).
• Atwood, supra note 22, at 485.
Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-633, 88 Stat. 2167(1975) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1901-1907 (1988)).
17 Miller, supra note 16, at 248.
I" Atwood, supra note 22, at 485.
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reporting, investigation of accidents, and recommenda-
tion of steps to prevent similar accidents.3 9 The 1974 Act,
which retained the prohibition against use of NTSB re-
ports as evidence in civil suits, 40 comprised the last major
piece of legislation impacting on civil aviation accident
investigation.
B. NTSB - Current Regulatory Framework
Regulations promulgated by the NTSB have been codi-
fied in Chapter VIII of Title 49 of the Code of Federal
39 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(a) (1988). The subsection states:
It shall be the duty of the National Transportation Safety Board to
(1) Make rules and regulations governing notification and report
of accidents involving civil aircraft;
(2) Investigate such accidents and report the facts, conditions, and
circumstances relating to each accident and the probable cause
thereof;
(3) Make such recommendations to the Secretary of Transporta-
tion as, in its opinion, will tend to prevent similar accidents in the
future;
(4) Make such reports public in such form and manner as may be
deemed by it to be in the public interest; and
(5) Ascertain what will best tend to reduce or eliminate the possi-
bility of, or recurrence of, accidents by conducting special studies
and investigations on matters pertaining to safety in air navigation
and the prevention of accidents.
Id.
40 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(e) (1988). The subsection states that "[n]o part of any
report or reports of the National Transportation Safety Board relating to any acci-
dent or the investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit
or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or
reports." Id. See Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, 317 F.2d 628, 631-32 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 895 (1963). In Berguido the court stated:
The fundamental policy underlying 1441 (e) appears to be a compro-
mise between the interests of those who would adopt a policy of ab-
solute privilege in order to secure full and frank disclosure as to the
probable cause and thus help prevent future accidents and the coun-
tervailing policy of making available all accident information to liti-
gants in a civil suit.
Id. See generally Atwood, supra note 22 (discussing regulatory and case law gloss on
section 1441 (e) and the distinction between factual and opinion material in NTSB
reports); Mark Dombroff& Cecile Hatfield, Documentation for Aircraft Accident Litiga-
tion, TRIAL, Aug. 1984, at 70-74 (detailing how and where to obtain NTSB and
FAA accident reports). Cf Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810, 816 (4th Cir.
1982) (affirming trial court's exclusion of conclusory sections of the NTSB
report).
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Regulations (NTSB regulations), of which part 800 de-
scribes the organization and functions of the NTSB and
permissible delegations of its authority.4' According to
section 800.3, the NTSB's primary function is to promote
transportation safety.42 Section 800.2 vests the NTSB's
investigatory powers in the Bureau of Accident Investiga-
tion.43 Finally, section 800.27 delegates authority to des-
ignated NTSB employees to issue subpoenas and take
depositions in connection with transportation accident
investigations.44
Part 831 of the NTSB regulations details the NTSB's
accident investigation procedures. Section 831.2 relates
the NTSB's responsibility to organize, conduct, and con-
trol "all accident investigations involving civil aircraft.1 45
The nature of the NTSB's accident investigations are de-
scribed in section 831.4, which, in keeping with the pri-
mary function of promoting safety, requires the NTSB to
4 49 C.F.R. §§ 800.1-.28 (1990).
42 Id. § 800.3(a).
43 Id. § 800.2(e). The subsection states:
(e) The Bureau of Accident Investigation, which conducts investiga-
tions of all major transportation accidents ...within the Board's
jurisdiction; recommends to the Board whether a public hearing or
deposition proceeding should be held to determine the facts, condi-
tions, and circumstances of major accidents; prepares a report for
release to the public regarding such accidents for submission to the
Board including a recommendation as to the probable cause(s); de-
termines the probable cause(s) of accidents where delegated author-
ity to do so by the Board; initiates safety recommendations to
prevent future transportation accidents ....
Id.; see also Id. § 800.25 (delegation of authority to the Director, Bureau of Acci-
dent Investigation).
4 Id. § 800.27. The regulation states:
The Board hereby delegates to any officer or employee of the Board
who is designated by the Chairman of the Safety Board the authority
to sign and issue subpoenas, and administer oaths and affirmations,
and to take depositions or cause them to be taken in connection with
the investigation of transportation accidents.
Id.
45 Id. § 831.2(a)(1) (emphasis added). Although the NTSB can delegate certain
aviation field investigations to the Federal Aviation Administration pursuant to a
request to the Department of Transportation (DOT), the National Transportation
Safety Board retains sole responsibility for determining probable cause of the acci-
dents. Id. § 831.2(a)(2).
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investigate accidents with a view toward "ascertain [ing]
measures which will best tend to prevent similar accidents
or incidents in the future. '46 Section 831.8 states that the
"investigator-in-charge" has responsibility for onsite in-
vestigation of accidents.47 Section 831.9, among other
powers, grants authority to NTSB representatives to enter
crash sites, secure relevant records (including medical
files and hospital records), and interrogate anyone having
information relating to the accident.48
III. EXEMPTIONS FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE
NTSB's REPORTS
Subsequent to the enactment of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act 49 and pursuant to the NTSB's enabling stat-
utes °5 0 reports prepared by or for the NTSB are generally
46 Id. § 831.4. The regulation goes on to say that accident investigations are
factual, not legal, in nature and are "not conducted for the purpose of determin-
ing the rights or liabilities of any person." Id. As one commentary stated, "[a]
central purpose of the NTSB Report is to provide statistical data for safety evalua-
tion and not to determine where fault lies for the purpose of litigation." Dom-
broff & Hatfield, supra note 40, at 71.
47 49 C.F.R. § 831.8 (1990).
48 Id. § 831.9. The regulation, in part, states:
(a) General. Any employee of the Board, upon presenting appropri-
ate credentials is authorized to enter any property wherein a trans-
portation accident has occurred or wreckage from any such accident
is located and do all things necessary for proper investigation. Upon
demand.., any Government agency, or person having possession or
control of ... any pertinent records and memoranda, including all
documents, papers, medical files, hospital records, and correspon-
dence now or hereafter existing and kept or required to be kept,
shall forthwith permit inspection, photographing, or copying thereof
... for the purpose of investigating an aircraft accident/incident ....
Authorized representatives of the Board may interrogate any person
having knowledge relevant to an aircraft accident/incident ....
Id.
49 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
-0 49 U.S.C. app. § 1903 (1988). In particular, the NTSB shall "report in writ-
ing on the facts, conditions, and circumstances of each accident investigated ...
and cause such reports to be made available to the public at reasonable cost." Id.
§ 1903(a)(2). Annually, the NTSB must compile a statistical summary of trans-
portation accidents investigated during the preceding year. Id. § 1904. Section
1905, which covers general public access to information, states:
(a) General
Copies of any communication, document, investigation, or other
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available for perusal by the public. Part 801 of the NTSB
regulations contains regulations concerning public availa-
bility of information.5 ' Part 801 implements the Freedom
of Information Act 52 and explicitly states that NTSB pol-
icy is "to make information available to the public to the
greatest extent possible. ' 53  Factual reports following
field investigation of accidents are made available for pub-
lic inspection, normally sixty days after the accident, and
reports containing determinations of probable cause are
normally available within six months of the accident.54
The above statutes and regulations demonstrate that
absent a statutory exemption or an exemption otherwise
provided by law, NTSB reports are available to the public.
The remainder of this section briefly examines statutory
exemptions to public disclosure, while the subsequent
sections analyze whether the psychotherapist-patient priv-
ilege and the constitutional right to privacy preclude the
NTSB from even discovering certain types of
information. 5
The primary statutory exemptions are contained within
the Freedom of Information Act 56 and the Privacy Act of
report, or information received or sent by the Board ... shall be
made available to the public upon identifiable request, and at rea-
sonable cost .... Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed
to require the release of any information described by subsection (b)
of section 552 of Title 5 [Freedom of Information Act], or which is
otherwise protected by law from disclosure to the public.
Id. § 1905.
- 49 C.F.R. §§ 801.1-.59 (1990).
.12 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
.- 49 C.F.R. § 801.2 (1990). "[A]Ii records of the Board, except those that the
Board specifically determines must not be disclosed ... for the protection of pri-
vate rights . . .are declared to be available for public inspection and copying, as
provided in this part." Id.
54 Id. §§ 801.30, 801.35.
55 It is important to note the distinction between information that, although
used by the NTSB to help make its determination of probable cause, cannot be
disclosed publicly because it falls within an exemption and information that the
NTSB is precluded from even obtaining. Information may potentially fall within
either category. For example, a pilot might assert his constitutional right to pri-
vacy to prevent the NTSB from obtaining certain information or from releasing
certain information.
* 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
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1974.57 Subsection (b) of the Freedom of Information Act
contains explicit exemptions from public disclosure58
which have been expressly incorporated into the NTSB
regulations. 59 The regulations include exemptions for in-
ternal personnel rules and practices of the NTSB,60 for
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and for records
compiled for law enforcement purposes. Part 80261 of the
NTSB regulations contains rules implementing the Pri-
vacy Act of 1974.62 Part 802, however, which restricts the
availability of NTSB records maintained on any individual
on personal privacy grounds,63 apparently is a seldom-
used rule. 64 A person desiring the NTSB to withhold in-
formation contained in a report from public disclosure
must make written objection to the NTSB, stating the
grounds for the objection.65
57 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988).
s8 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988). The statute lists the exemptions [pertinent to this
comment] as follows:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are -
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy;
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,
but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement
records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere
with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right
to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,
Id.
49 C.F.R. §§ 801.50-.59 (1990) (Subpart F of Part 801).
See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport on August 2, 1985, 117
F.R.D. 392, 394 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (holding the NTSB's pre-decisional analytical
documents to be exempt from public disclosure under 49 C.F.R. § 801.54).
61 49 C.F.R. §§ 802.1-.20 (1990).
62 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988).
63 49 C.F.R. § 802.1 (1990). "NTSB policy encompasses the safeguarding of
individual privacy from any misuse of Federal records and the provision of access
to individuals to NTSB records concerning them, except where such access is in
conflict with the Freedom of Information Act, or other statute." Id.
'- Miller, supra note 16, at 256 (stating in 1981, that the NTSB regulations con-
cerning the Privacy Act of 1974 had never been exercised).
6c5 49 C.F.R. § 831.6 (1990).
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IV. LIMITATIONS UPON THE NTSB'S INVESTIGATORY
POWERS
Whereas the previous section examined statutory ex-
emptions from public disclosure of information gathered
by the NTSB, this section focuses on extrinsic limitations
upon the NTSB's investigatory powers. That is, with a
view toward the NTSB's desire to obtain a pilot's post-
crash psychotherapeutic records, what limitations exist
that preclude the NTSB from obtaining such informa-
tion? After briefly examining the requirements for en-
forcement of an administrative subpoena, the remainder
of this section will probe the psychotherapist-patient priv-
ilege and the constitutional right to privacy as possible
limitations upon the NTSB's investigatory powers.
A. Enforcement of an Administrative Subpoena
As mentioned above, the NTSB regulations empower
NTSB representatives to issue subpoenas, administer
oaths, and take depositions in connection with aviation ac-
cident investigations.66 The power to issue an administra-
tive subpoena is especially relevant in the context of this
paper, since the NTSB would likely have to issue a sub-
poena to compel production of a pilot's psychotherapy
records.6 7 In United States v. Morton Salt Co.,68 the United
States Supreme Court set up a three part test to deter-
mine whether an administrative subpoena may be en-
forced in a district court: (1) whether the inquiry falls
within the scope of the agency's power; (2) whether the
demand is sufficiently definite; and (3) whether the infor-
mation solicited is reasonably relevant to the authorized
inquiry. 69 The Morton Salt test certainly presents a thresh-
old limitation upon the right of the NTSB to issue admin-
istrative subpoenas. In Morton Salt and other cases,
- 49 C.F.R. § 800.27 (1990).
67 See, e.g., NTSB v. Hollywood Memorial Hosp., 735 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Fla.
1990) appeal dismissed, 933 F.2d 1021 (11 th Cir. 1991).
- 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
, Id. at 652.
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however, this test has been liberally applied by courts in
order to facilitate administrative agencies' performance of
their congressional mandates.7 °
B. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
The psychotherapist-patient privilege, the second pos-
sible limitation upon the NTSB's investigatory powers,
will be examined from the following perspectives: (1) his-
torical origin; (2) theoretical justifications for the privi-
lege; and (3) federal case law treatment of the privilege.
As will be shown, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
of relatively recent origin. Furthermore, the theoretical
underpinnings of the privilege are not necessarily sup-
ported by empirical studies, and although many states
have codified the privilege, federal courts are split over
recognition of such a privilege.
1. Historical Origin of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
Examination of the general physician-patient privilege
will help trace the origin of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. The physician-patient privilege is merely one of
several types of "relational privileges," such as the attor-
ney-client privilege and the clergy-parishioner privilege.7'
7) E.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Finklea, 442 F. Supp. 821, 824 (S.D.
W. Va. 1977) (enforcing subpoena duces tecum served by the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health).
71 See generally Daniel W. Shuman, The Origins of the Physician-Patient Privilege and
Professional Secret, 39 Sw. L.J. 661 (1985) (excellent contrast between the eviden-
tiary treatment of the physician-patient relationship by the common law and the
civil law systems). Shuman defines a number of terms relating to the physician-
patient relationship:
Privilege is the common law term for a rule favoring privacy over
probative evidence and professional secret is its civil law counter-
part. Privilege and professional secret are not, however, different
words describing the same thing as these doctrines differ substan-
tially in their application.
Confidentiality is the ethical duty of the professional, operating
outside of the judicial setting, not to disclose confidential communi-
cations made by the patient or client. Secrecy is the expectation that
a communication will not be disclosed. Privacy is the ability to con-
trol revelation of information about oneself.
Id. at 661 n. 1. For purposes of this paper, the distinction between a privilege and
1991] 481
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Early Roman law, in refusing to compel an attorney to
testify against his client, represents perhaps the earliest
reference to a relational privilege.72 In the Middle Ages,
canon law permeated continental European codes, result-
ing in a prohibition of clergy testifying against a parish-
ioner who had "confessed. ' 73 English common law did
not develop a need for relational privileges until the six-
teenth century enactment of the Statute of Elizabeth
which "abolished suit for maintenance against a witness
and authorized penalties for a witness's refusal to
testify." 74
Although the English common law quickly recognized
an attorney-client privilege subsequent to the Statute of
Elizabeth, 75 the physician-patient privilege did not appear
in case law for over two centuries.76 In Rex v. Duchess of
Kingston,7 7 Lord Mansfield rejected the notion that a phy-
sician's honor militated in favor of the existence of a phy-
sician-patient privilege:
If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be
sure he would be guilty of a breach of honour and of great
indiscretion; but, to give that information in a court ofjus-
tice, which by the law of the land he is bound to do, will
a professional secret is not important, and thus the term privilege will be used to
describe either concept.
72 Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client,
16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 488 (1928). Shuman speculated that the attorney-client priv-
ilege under Roman law probably derived from the prohibition against a slave or
servant testifying against his master. Shuman, supra note 71, at 667.
71 Shuman, supra note 71, at 668.
74 Id. at 669. Prior to the fifteenth century, the jury functioned as trier and
witness; other witnesses, viewed as meddlers, were discouraged from volunteering
testimony by the threat of a suit for maintenance, a common law tort actionable
against one who stirred up litigation. Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The
Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C.
L. REV. 893, 904 (1982).
75 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542-43 U. McNaughten rev.
ed. 1961).
76 Shuman, supra note 71, at 671.
77 20 How. St. Tr. 355 (1776), cited in Shuman, supra note 71, at 671-73. In
Duchess of Kingston, the testimony solicited from the physician related to the Duch-
ess' disclosure of the father of her child, as distinguished from communications
relating purely to her medical care. Duchess of Kingston, 201 How. St. Tr. at 577,
cited in Shuman, supra note 71, at 671.
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never be imputed to him as any indiscretion whatever.78
Even to this day, English courts apparently do not recog-
nize a general physician-patient privilege, the rationale
for rejecting the privilege having shifted from an "honor
among gentlemen" notion to the perceived lack of neces-
sity for the privilege.79 The courts believed that patients
would not withhold information necessary for adequate
treatment merely because of a remote threat of disclosure
in a courtroom.8 0
American legislatures, by contrast, have not been reluc-
tant to establish, by statute, various types of physician-
patient privileges. As of 1982, a survey conducted by Pro-
fessor Shuman revealed that all but two states had a physi-
cian-patient, psychiatrist-patient, psychologist-patient, or
psychotherapist-patient privilege statute.8' Interestingly,
in spite of overwhelming support for a psychotherapist-
patient privilege in the state legislatures, Congress de-
clined to adopt the Supreme Court's proposed Federal
Rule of Evidence 504,82 instead opting to enact a general
Is Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. at 573, cited in Shuman, supra note 71, at
671. The reluctance of pre-1776 English courts to recognize a physician-patient
privilege may have stemmed in part from the relatively unreliable nature of medi-
cal science; in fact, the medical "profession" was more akin to a trade, not consid-
ered worthy of an attorney's professional respect. Shuman, supra note 71, at 671-
73. Some might argue that relations between the legal and medical professions
have made little progress in the ensuing two centuries.
79 Shuman, supra note 71, at 674-75.
-o Id. at 674.
81 Shuman & Weiner, supra note 74, at 907. Common characteristics of the phy-
sician-patient privilege statutes among the states include: (1) application to judi-
cially compelled disclosure only; (2) "ownership" of the privilege by the patient
(thus, the patient can waive the privilege); and (3) the non-absoluteness of the
privilege. Shuman, supra note 71, at 678.
8 The rejected psychotherapist-patient privilege, Rule 504, stated:
(a) DEFINITIONS. (1) A "patient" is a person who consults or is
examined or interviewed by a psychotherapist. (2) A "psychothera-
pist" is (A) a person authorized to practice medicine in any state or
nation, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be, while engaged
in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition,
including drug addiction, or (B) a person licensed or certified as a
psychologist under the laws of any state or nation, while similarly
engaged. (3) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to
be disclosed to third persons other than those present to further the
interest of the patient in the consultation, examination, or interview,
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rule that preserved existing common law privileges and
provided for the development of privileges in accordance
with common law principles.8 3 The theoretical bases tra-
or persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the commu-
nication, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treat-
ment under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members
of the patient's family.
(b) GENERAL RULE OF PRIVILEGE. A patient has a privilege to refuse
to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confi-
dential communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or
treatment of his mental or emotional condition, including drug ad-
diction, among himself, his psychotherapist, or persons who are par-
ticipating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the
psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family.
(C) WHO MAY CLAIM THE PRIVILEGE. The privilege may be claimed by
the patient, by his guardian or conservator, or by the personal repre-
sentative of a deceased patient. The person who was the psycho-
therapist may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the patient.
His authority to do so is presumed in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.
(d) EXCEPTIONS.
(1) Proceedings for hospitalization. There is no privilege under
this rule for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to
hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the psychotherapist in
the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient
is in need of hospitalization.
(2) Examination by order of judge. If the judge orders an exami-
nation of the mental or emotional condition of the patient, commu-
nications made in the course thereof are not privileged under this
rule with respect to the particular purpose for which the examina-
tion is ordered unless the judge orders otherwise.
(3) Condition an element of claim or defense. There is no privi-
lege under this rule as to communications relevant to an issue of the
mental or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in
which he relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or
defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any
party relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense.
FED. R. EvID. 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-44 (1972).
- ERIC D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 73
(1988). In fact, Congress rejected each of the nine non-constitutional privileges
proposed by the Supreme Court, instead choosing to enact a single general rule.
Id. The general rule, Rule 501, states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of rea-
son and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which state law
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ditionally offered in favor of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege are examined in the next section.
2. Theoretical Justifications of the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege
Commentators have identified two different views of
the theoretical underpinnings of the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege: a utilitarian approach and a deontological
approach. 4 Dean Wigmore, in championing the utilita-
rian approach, suggested that any privilege must be justi-
fied by four relational elements:
(1) The communication sought to be protected must
originate in a confidence that it will be free from
disclosure.
(2) This confidence must be an integral part of a whole-
some and complete relationship between the parties.
(3) This relationship must be one which the balance of
the community desires to sedulously foster.
(4) The impairment of the relationship that would issue
from disclosure must exceed the benefit that would be
achieved in the litigation process by having the additional
evidence. 85
The utilitarian approach balances the utility of the rela-
tional privilege to the "relationship it seeks to protect and
the relationship's value to society."8 6 The deontological
approach, by contrast, insists that, due to personal auton-
omy reasons, society should protect extremely private
personal revelations, such as communications between a
patient and a psychotherapist, from unwarranted intru-
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, gov-
ernment, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined
in accordance with state law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
,4 See generally Shuman, supra note 71 (examining the basic analytical approaches
to the conflict between the need to accept all relevant evidence and policies justi-
fying exclusion of relevant evidence).
"- 8 WIGMORE, supra note 75, at 527.
" Shuman, supra note 71, at 663.
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sions.8 7  The deontological approach to a psychothera-
pist-patient privilege tends to cross over into the realm of
the right to privacy. Professor David Louisell, perhaps
the chief proponent of the deontological view, has
claimed that privileges stem from the "right to be let
alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly
prescribed relationships. "88
Given the overlap between the deontological justifica-
tion of a psychotherapist-patient privilege and the consti-
tutional right to privacy, federal courts recognizing a
federal psychotherapist-patient privilege have often ad-
dressed the constitutional right to privacy issue.8 9 These
courts stray from the original rationale for the privilege;
the advisory committee note to proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 504 explicitly and exclusively relied upon the
utilitarian approach as justification for the privilege.90 In-
terestingly, even the utilitarian justification for the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege notoriously lacks empirical
support. 9' In the future, courts and commentators de-
parting from the utilitarian approach and relying on the
deontological approach are unlikely to find broad support
in the constitutional right to privacy, given the reticence
of the Rehnquist Supreme Court to expand any constitu-
tionally based rights to privacy. The following section
examines federal case law considering a federal psycho-
therapist-patient privilege.
87 Id. at 665.
8 David Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 110-11 (1956).
89 For discussion of cases recognizing a federal psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege, see infra notes 92-138 and accompanying text.
110 FED. R. EVID. 504 advisory comm. note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-44 (1972). After
referencing articles and reports justifying existence of a psychotherapist-patient
privilege, the note states that "[t]he conclusion is reached that Wigmore's four
conditions needed to justify the existence of a privilege are amply satisfied." Id.
See also Shuman & Weiner, supra note 74, at 899.
91 See generally Shuman & Weiner, supra note 74 (concluding that the existence
of a privileged relationship between psychotherapist and patient is of conse-
quence to few patients in few cases).
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3. Case Law Discussing a Federal Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege
In general, federal courts have been reluctant to recog-
nize a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege. Many
courts have refused to recognize the privilege for the for-
malistic reason that no such privilege existed at common
law. As shown below, however, a decided split on the is-
sue exists among the circuit courts of appeals. Courts em-
bracing the privilege have often utilized the constitutional
right to privacy to help justify the existence of the
privilege.
a. Courts Rejecting Recognition of a Federal Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege
A number of courts have refused to recognize the exist-
ence of a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege.92 In In
re Doe, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held, inter alia, that the patient files of the defend-
ant psychiatrist were not protected from disclosure by any
federal psychotherapist-patient privilege.9 3 As part of an
investigation of a medical clinic allegedly serving as a
front for the illegal sale of quaaludes, a grand jury sub-
poenaed patient files from a psychiatrist associated with
the clinic. 94 The psychiatrist claimed that the psychother-
apist-patient privilege shielded the files from produc-
tion.95 Rather than "leaping" to contemplation of the
scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Second
Circuit first considered whether such a privilege even ex-
isted under federal law. Noting that Congress had de-
92 See, e.g., In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Meagher,
531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976); United States v. Colletta,
602 F. Supp. 1322, 1327 (E.D. Pa.) ("[t]here is no general federal common-law
physician-patient privilege"), aff'd mere., 770 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1985).
: Doe, 711 F.2d at 1193-94.
, Id. at 1189. The clinic apparently operated by hiring and paying doctors on a
daily basis. Even though the doctors' medical specialties included acupuncture,
gynecology, and psychiatry, the doctors prescribed quaaludes to over ninety per-
cent of the clinics' patients. Id. at 1190.
w, Id. at 1193.
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clined to adopt the proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
504(b), the court then outlined a series of cases demon-
strating that most courts which have grappled with the is-
sue have decided that the privilege does not exist in
federal law since no physician-patient privilege exists at
common law.96 The court further declined to recognize a
psychotherapist-patient privilege after establishing that
the four utilitarian conditions set forth by Wigmore were
not satisfied;97 in particular, the court was impressed by
the lack of trust and confidence between the psychiatrist
and the seventy patients "treated" per day on average and
the want of any "intensely personal" communications in
the patient files.98 Almost as an afterthought, the court
summed up with the conclusory "balancing test" state-
ment that "the exclusion of [the psychiatrist's] patient
files would not serve a public good that transcends the
need for this evidence in the search for truth." 99
In United States v. Meagher, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction of
Meagher for bank robbery. 00 The government had re-
butted Meagher's insanity defense, in part, with corre-
spondence between Meagher and his psychiatrist that
indicated that Meagher was not insane.' 01 On appeal,
Meagher contended that admission of the letters violated
his psychotherapist-patient privilege. 0 2 The Fifth Circuit
rejected Meagher's appeal, concluding that no such privi-
lege existed at common law. 0 3
6 Id.
97 For a list of the four Wigmore conditions, see supra note 85 and accompany-
ing text.
98 Doe, 711 F.2d at 1193.
-Id.
1- Meagher, 531 F.2d at 754.
lo, Id. at 752-53. The letters expressed regret by Meagher about his "sordid"
life. Id. at 754.
102 Id. at 753.
103 Id. The court further noted that even proposed Rule 504 explicitly excepted
from the scope of the privilege those instances where a defendant relied upon
mental condition as part of his defense. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 504(d)(3) (transmitted
to Congress on Feb. 5, 1973, not enacted). See infra note 114.
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b. Courts Recognizing a Federal Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege
A few federal courts have explicitly recognized a federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 0 4 In consolidated ap-
peals in In re Zuniga, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed civil contempt orders
against two psychotherapists who had refused to appro-
priately respond to subpoenas duces tecum issued by
grandjuries. In each case, a psychotherapist had been im-
plicated in an alleged scheme to defraud an insurance
company.' 0 5 In the first case, Pierce, a licensed psychia-
trist in Michigan, refused to submit eighteen patient files
and supporting documentation redacted to show only the
names of the patients and times of their treatments.'0 6 In
the second case, Zuniga, also a licensed psychiatrist, re-
fused to comply with a similar grand jury subpoena duces
tecum soliciting the records of 268 persons that he pur-
portedly treated.' 0 7 In each case, when the psychothera-
pist persisted in his refusal to comply with the subpoena
even after denial of a motion to quash, the district court
found the psychotherapist to be in civil contempt.'0 8 On
consolidated appeal, Pierce and Zuniga asserted, inter alia,
that the documents sought by the grand jury must be pro-
tected from disclosure based upon a psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege and the patients' constitutional right to
104 See, e.g., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983
(1983); NTSB v. Hollywood Memorial Hosp., 735 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
appeal dismissed, 933 F.2d 1021 (11 th Cir. 1991); United States v. Friedman, 636 F.
Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
105 Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 634.
1o6 Id.
107 Id. at 635. A second subpoena issued to Zuniga demanded that Zuniga pro-
duce the following records for 268 persons covering twenty-one specific dates
over a six-year period: (1) patient appointment books indicating patient names
and type or length of psychotherapeutical services rendered; (2) patient sign-in
sheets; (3) Zuniga's daily activity logs; (4) patient files redacted to show patient
name, date of service, and type of psychotherapy session rendered and billed; (5)
original patient ledger cards; and (6) original intra-office forms indicating type
and date of services rendered. Id.
1o Id. at 634-36.
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privacy. 109
In its analysis of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
issue, the Sixth Circuit began by noting that questions of
privilege were governed by federal law since the federal
grand jury was investigating allegations of federal crimi-
nal law violations."l 0 After setting forth the text of Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 501 in its entirety,"' the court
acknowledged that Congress had substituted this genera-
lized privilege rule for the specific privilege rules (includ-
ing rule 504, the psychotherapist-patient privilege)
proposed by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee
on Rules of Evidence." t2 The court, however, disagreed
with the Government's argument that Congress' election
to reject the proposed rule 504 precluded recognition of a
federal psychiatrist-patient privilege." 3 The court noted
that rule 501 explicitly allowed for development of federal
evidentiary privileges.' 4 After citing the typical utilita-
0 Id. at 636. For the Sixth Circuit's treatment of the argument based upon the
constitutional right to privacy, see infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
't0 Id.
I For the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 501, see supra note 83.
112 Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 636.
13 Id. at 637.
1'4 Id. The Sixth Circuit quoted the following passage from an opinion of the
Supreme Court: On the contrary, "[t]he Federal Rules of Evidence acknowledge
the authority of the federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of
testimonial privilege in federal criminal trials 'governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted ... in light of reason and experience.'"
Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (quoting FED. R.
EvID. 501)). The view that a court might adopt a federal psychotherapist-patient
privilege finds support in the Senate Report to the Federal Rules:
The committee has received a considerable volume of correspon-
dence from psychiatric organizations and psychiatrists concerning
the deletion of rule 504 of the rule submitted by the Supreme Court.
It should be clearly understood that, in approving this general rule
[501] as to privileges, the action of Congress should not be under-
stood as disapproving any recognition of a psychiatric-patient, or
husband-wife, or any other of the enumerated privileges contained
in the Supreme Court rules. Rather, our action should be under-
stood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based
on a confidential relationship and other privileges should be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis.
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35,294 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059.
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rian arguments in support of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege,"15 the Sixth Circuit catalogued a series of cases
documenting the split in federal circuits regarding the
privilege. 1 6 Observing the adoption of diverse forms of
psychotherapist-patient privileges by several states and
noting the advocacy of commentators toward adoption of
the privilege, the court rejected persuasive authority to
the contrary and concluded that a "psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege is mandated by 'reason and
experience.' 1117
Having thus recognized the existence of a psychothera-
pist-patient privilege, the Sixth Circuit then turned its at-
tention to the scope of the privilege. The court adopted a
balancing test that weighed the "interests protected by
shielding the evidence sought [against] those advanced by
disclosure." '"18 Applying the balancing test to the infor-
mation sought by the grand jury subpoenas, the court de-
termined that the interests protected by shielding the
names of patients and the dates and lengths of treatment
were outweighed by society's significant interest in gath-
ering all evidence related to enforcement of its laws." 9
Thus, this information did not fall within the privilege.
11.1 Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 638. See also supra notes 85-86, 90 and accompanying
text (discussing the utilitarian argument).
116 Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 638.
117 Id. at 639. The court stated:
[S]ociety has an interest in successful treatment of mental illness be-
cause of the possibility that a mentally ill person will pose a danger
to the community.
This Court has evaluated these interests, taking into account the
aforementioned position of the states, the Judicial Conference Advi-
sory Committee and various commentators, and finds that these in-
terests, in general, outweigh the need for evidence in the
administration of criminal justice. Therefore, we conclude that a
psychotherapist-patient privilege is mandated by "reason and expe-
rience." Rule 501.
Id.
118 Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 640.
119 Id. In Zuniga, the court noted that even if the identity of the patient and span
of treatment had fallen within the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
the patients could not benefit from the privilege since the patients had previously
disclosed their identities to the insurance company, a third party. Id.
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In NTSB v. Hollywood Memorial Hospital,'20 Root, the
"mystery" pilot, moved in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida to quash the NTSB's
subpoena of his post-crash psychiatric records.12 1 In con-
sidering whether to grant Root's motion to quash, the
court briefly discussed the status of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege in Florida and in the Eleventh Circuit.' 22
Although the Eleventh Circuit had rejected recognition of
a psychotherapist-patient privilege in criminal trials, the
court noted that the law was unsettled in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in the context of civil matters.'2 After citing federal
cases which had accorded constitutional protection to
communications in the psychotherapist-patient relation-
ship, the district court set forth a balancing test more re-
strictive than that used in Zuniga:'24  "[t]he privilege will
remain in effect unless a compelling state interest outweighs
the privilege."125
Rather than immediately applying the balancing test,
the court then turned to a discussion of the constitutional
right to privacy and applied a less restrictive balancing
120 NTSB v. Hollywood Memorial Hosp., 735 F. Supp. 423, 423 (S.D. Fla.
1990), appeal dismissed, 933 F.2d 1021 (11th Cir. 1991).
121 See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text for the background of Root and
Hollywood Memorial Hosp.
122 735 F. Supp. at 423-24. The district court failed to explicitly analyze
whether state or federal law on privileges should apply; however, the court ap-
peared to base its decision on federal law. Thus, the court's revelation that the
State of Florida does recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege and that the
Eleventh Circuit does not recognize such a privilege in criminal trials is merely
informative in nature. See id. at 423; United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 566-
67 (11 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1084 (1989) (rejecting psychotherapist-
patient privilege in criminal trial); Ursry v. Florida, 428 So. 2d 713, 714 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 438 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1983). See also FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 90.503 (West 1979 & Supp. 1991).
123 Hollywood Memorial Hosp., 735 F. Supp. at 423. The district court presumably
did not consider recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege in civil matters
foreclosed by the Eleventh Circuit's rejection of the privilege in criminal trials
since the state ostensibly may assert a more compelling interest in obtaining all of
the evidence in a criminal trial.
24 See supra note 118-19 and accompanying text.
12.5 Hollywood Memorial Hosp., 735 F. Supp. at 424 (emphasis added). In Zuniga,
the court balanced "the interests protected by shielding the evidence sought with
those advanced by disclosure." 714 F.2d at 640. Clearly, the Zuniga court re-
quired only a legitimate state interest to be balanced against the privilege.
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test, requiring only a legitimate state interest to override
the patient's privacy interest. 2 6 As in Zuniga, the court
then set forth the typical utilitarian justifications for the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, including Wigmore's
four conditions necessary to establish a privilege, 27 and
held that a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege ex-
isted. 21 In performing the balancing test, the court ac-
knowledged that the NTSB's statutory duty to investigate
Root's airplane crash established a valid public interest;
however, the court held that Root's privilege was greater
than the state interest, particularly since Root's communi-
cations were not part of a "criminal proceeding involving
Root's claims or defenses."'' 29
Unfortunately, the court chose not to develop the ex-
tent of the public interest inherent in the NTSB's statu-
126 Hollywood Memorial Hosp., 735 F. Supp. at 424. The court stated "[a]gain, the
privacy right must be balanced against legitimate state interests in order to pro-
tect the communications." Id. For discussion of the court's application of the
balancing test in the context of the constitutional right to privacy, see infra notes
193-97 and accompanying text.
Upon close examination, the two balancing tests are definitely not identical.
The common element of the tests is that the state interests are balanced against
the interest sought to be protected. The protected interest in the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege is the confidential communication, while the protected inter-
est in the constitutional analysis is the right to privacy. The privacy right
ostensibly is broader than the mere communication between psychotherapist and
patient and could extend to protect even the fact that the patient has received
psychotherapeutic services. Thus, the balancing tests are not precisely the same.
More importantly, a court would be remiss if it jumped immediately to application
of either balancing test without first establishing that the interest sought to be
protected is entitled to protection at all. That is, a sagacious court should not
apply a balancing test to determine the scope of a psychotherapist-patient privilege
without first establishing that a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege even ex-
ists. Likewise, a court should not apply a balancing test to determine whether the
legitimate state interests outweigh the patient's privacy interest without first es-
tablishing that the privacy interest in question has been afforded constitutional
protection. Finally, even if the interests sought to be protected essentially merge
into the same interest, the balancing test would not be identical unless the court
further determines that the appropriate standard of review is identical. Obvi-
ously, a "compelling" state interest standard is not identical to a "legitimate"
state interest standard.
127 For Wigmore's four conditions necessary to establish a privilege, see supra
text accompanying note 85.
1281 Hollywood Memorial Hosp., 735 F. Supp. at 424-25.
1-' Id.
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tory duty to investigate air accidents.13 0  As previously
discussed, Congress has charged the NTSB with impor-
tant functions including investigation and reporting of air
accidents and recommendation of steps to prevent similar
accidents.' 3' In addition to failing to develop the extent
of the public interest, the court also neglected to discuss
whether Root had waived the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, if any existed, by choosing to become a certified
pilot, at least to the extent that communications between
Root and his psychotherapists might reveal a psychosis
that could be the basis for the NTSB to deny medical cer-
tification. 32 The court's brevity in application of the bal-
ancing test suggests that the court did not consider the
test seriously, unlike Zuniga, where the Sixth Circuit rec-
ognized that while a psychotherapist-patient privilege ex-
isted, serious application of the balancing test militated
against automatic application of the privilege.
11 Rather, the court perfunctorily concluded that the "specific injury to the psy-
chiatric-psychotherapist patient relationship which will follow disclosure in cases
of this type is greater than the particular state interest involved." Id. at 425.
13, For discussion of responsibilities of the NTSB, see supra notes 36-48 and
accompanying text.
112 Hollywood Memorial Hosp., 735 F. Supp. at 424-25. Based on the following
regulations, the NTSB can deny medical certification to a pilot with a psychosis.
Subsection (d)(1)(i)(b) of sections 67.13 (first-class medical certificate), 67.15
(second-class medical certificate), and 67.17 (third-class medical certificate) of the
Federal Aviation Regulations reads in pertinent part:
(d) Mental and neurologic-
(1) Mental.
(i) No established medical history or clinical diagnosis of either of
the following:
(b) A psychosis.
F.A.A. Medical Standards and Certification, 14 C.F.R. §§ 67.13(d)(l)(i)(b),
67.15(d)(l)(i)(b), 67.17(d)(l)(i)(b) (1991). The NTSB has denied medical certifi-
cation of pilots upon findings that suicide attempts indicated a psychosis. See, e.g.,
McCartor v. Okamoto, NTSB Docket No. SE-10170 (May 31, 1989) (student pilot
flew into rage and struck flight instructor in apparent suicide attempt); In re For-
rette, NTSB Order No. EA-2929 (April 3, 1989) (suicide attempt by paranoid
schizophrenic); Administrator v. Hopkins, 2 N.T.S.B. 2318 (1976) (suicide at-
tempt following cancellation of marriage by bride-to-be); Administrator v. Badley,
2 N.T.S.B. 1468 (1975) (three suicide attempts); Administrator v. Evert, I
N.T.S.B. 489 (1969) (two suicide attempts).
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In United States v. Friedman,13 3 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York also consid-
ered whether to apply a federal psychotherapist-patient
privilege. In Friedman, the defendant in a criminal prose-
cution subpoenaed the psychiatric records of a person an-
ticipated to be an adverse witness in his criminal trial.13 4
The patient moved to quash the subpoenas by virtue of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Following in camera
inspection of the records, the court substantially granted
the motion to quash. 13 5 Unlike Hollywood Memorial Hospi-
tal, the court noted that courts have addressed protection
of psychiatric records in terms of both privilege and right
to privacy.' 3 6 Under either approach, the court further
noted that the analysis generally reduced to a balancing of
"the interest in disclosure of the particular material there
at issue against the witness-patient's interest in the confi-
dentiality of that information."' 1 7  Unfortunately, the
court did not first expressly consider whether a federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege should exist at all or
whether the constitutional right to privacy should protect
such communications. Choosing to base its decision
upon the privilege approach, the court held that the com-
munications between the witness and his psychiatrist were
entitled to protection under the psychotherapist-patient
privilege since all four of the Wigmore conditions were
satisfied. 138
-3 636 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
134 Id. at 462.
'" Id. The court acknowledged that its decision was not an evidentiary ruling
since the content of the psychiatric records of the purported witness was irrele-
vant to the criminal charges against the defendant. Instead, the court was consid-
ering whether to permit use of the psychotherapist-patient privilege to preclude
even discovery of the material. Id.
I"- Id.
137 Id.
."- Id. at 463. The court justified its application of the privilege as follows:
[T]he material here subpoenaed contains the type of intensely per-
sonal communications that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
designed to protect. The notes contain extremely personal state-
ments made by the patient, recollections of past experiences, notes
of dreams, as well as observations of the patient by the doctor.
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c. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Context of NTSB
Air Accident Investigations
As the cases in the preceding sections demonstrate,
there is a decided split in authority over whether to recog-
nize a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege. The per-
tinent question here is not only whether the privilege
should exist at all but whether the privilege, if a court
should choose to recognize it, may be used as a stumbling
block to the NTSB's statutory authority to investigate air
accidents. If a court bases the privilege on Wigmore's
four utilitarian conditions, 3 9 the court should establish
that the enormous benefit that society receives from com-
plete and accurate air accident investigations by the NTSB
is outweighed by the impairment to the psychotherapist-
patient relationship caused by disclosure. When the pa-
tient is a licensed pilot, the court should further address
whether the patient has chosen to waive any psychothera-
pist-patient privilege, at least to the extent that the com-
munications might reveal the probable cause of the
accident. Unfortunately, the court in Hollywood Memorial
Hospital neglected to address or develop these issues. 140
On the other hand, if the court relies upon the deonto-
logical approach to establish the privilege, the court is still
obligated to decide whether the privilege, qualified in na-
ture, is overridden by the societal interest in permitting
the NTSB to obtain the additional evidence. This balanc-
ing test overlaps with the utilitarian analysis of the preced-
ing paragraph as well as the subsequent discussion of the
constitutional right to privacy.
C. The Constitutional Right to Privacy
The third limitation upon the NTSB's investigatory
powers addressed in this comment is the constitutional
Id. For Wigmore's four conditions necessary to establish a privilege, see supra
note 85 and accompanying text.
'9 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
140 NTSB v. Hollywood Memorial Hosp., 735 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Fla. 1990),
appeal dismissed, 933 F.2d 1021 (11 th Cir. 1991).
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right to privacy. This controversial right will be discussed
as follows: (1) origin and development of the constitu-
tional right to privacy; (2) application of the constitutional
right to privacy in the context of medical or psychother-
apeutical records; and (3) analysis of the constitutional
right to privacy in the context of NTSB air accident
investigations.
1. Origin and Geneology of the Constitutional Right to Privacy
Thousands of trees have likely been felled to accommo-
date the words penned tracing the evolution of the consti-
tutional right to privacy. Thus, little would be gained in
this comment through an exhaustive treatment of the sub-
ject. Nevertheless, a brief summary of the development of
the constitutional right to privacy will shed light on the
case law discussed in the subsequent section.
Although there is wide disparity of opinion over the ori-
gin of the constitutional right to privacy, 14' most com-
mentators would agree that Griswold v. Connecticut 142
breathed life into the modern doctrine. ' 43 In Griswold, the
Supreme Court struck a Connecticut statute relating to
contraceptives on the grounds that the statute infringed
upon the right of married persons to decide whether to
use contraceptives, a right found to be protected by a "pe-
numbra" of constitutional privacy rights.144 Justice Doug-
'4, See Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) (many point to this seminal article as the first to articulate the
right to privacy); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (conceptualizing a "right to be let alone"). But see Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 740-41 (1989) (in which
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) is considered as ancient prece-
dent for the proposition that the Supreme Court may reach beyond the express
language of the Constitution to strike legislation offensive to Constitutional
principles).
142 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14, See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 141. "The emergence of this substantive
right to privacy, and hence the constitutional protection of the conduct to which it
applies, is of very recent origin. The doctrine is only some twenty years old." Id.
at 740. "The right to privacy was first announced in Griswold v. Connecticut
.... Id. at 740 n. 11.
144 381 U.S. at 485.
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las, writing for the Court, eschewed any reliance upon the
discarded doctrine of substantive due process' 45 and pur-
ported to find a general right to privacy in the "penum-
bras" of the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments to
the Constitution. 46  Unlike Douglas, other justices have
not hesitated to link the constitutional right to privacy
with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
despite the undeniable similarities with the loathsome
doctrine of Lochnerism. 47
Perhaps because of the Supreme Court's difficulty in at-
taching this constitutional right to privacy to an enumer-
ated constitutional provision, post-Griswold cases have had
trouble articulating the scope of the right. 48 Neverthe-
less, the Court's right to privacy decisions have been de-
scribed as protecting two distinct types of privacy
interests: "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure
145 Id. The use of the substantive due process doctrine is typified by early twen-
tieth century cases such as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Under the
fourteenth amendment, the doctrine was applied to strike state regulations which
infringed upon fundamental economic rights, such as the liberty of contract. Loch-
ner and its progeny proved to be a much criticized line of cases, and the Court
eventually abandoned its substantive due process jurisprudence. West Coast Ho-
tel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304
U.S. 144 (1938) (affording state economic regulations a presumption of constitu-
tionality). As recently as two years prior to Griswold, the Court again renounced
Lochnerism, stating that it "emphatically refuse[d] to go back to the time when
courts used the Due Process Clause 'to strike down state laws .. .because they
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought.'" Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (quoting William-
son v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)).
,46 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
147 In Griswold, Justice Goldberg argued that the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment protects all "fundamental" rights. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring). Justice Harlan asserted that the due process clause protects those
basic values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 500 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 349, 325 (1937)). See also
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (Blackmun, J.) (finding "[t]his right of
privacy" to "be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal lib-
erty and restrictions upon state action"). This comment may refer to a case as one
involving a constitutional right to privacy when the particular issue might be bet-
ter characterized as merely involving a "fundamental" right protected by the doc-
trine of substantive due process.
14t E.g. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (stating that, regardless of its source, "[tlhis right
of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy").
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of personal matters, and... the interest in independence
in making certain kinds of important decisions. "149 The
first interest can be characterized as an informational pri-
vacy interest, protecting against governmental disclosure
of intimate matters. 150 The second interest, termed a pri-
vacy interest of autonomy, protects against governmental
compulsion in making important personal decisions.' 5'
Regardless of the type of privacy implicated, Griswold
and its progeny make it clear that the fundamental rights
afforded the highest degree of protection under the um-
brella of the constitutional right to privacy tend to fall
within three related areas: family relationships, marriage,
and procreation. 52 Outside of these areas, courts recog-
nize other privacy interests which, although perhaps wor-
149 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (opinion of Stevens, J.). Jus-
tice Stevens cited Professor Kurland as having first categorized the three aspects
of a constitutional right to privacy: (1) an individual's right to be free from gov-
ernmental intrusion into his personal affairs; (2) an individual's right to preclude
the government from disclosing his private affairs; and (3) an individual's right to
be free from government coercion in making certain vital decisions. Id. at 599
n.24 (quoting from Kurland, The Private I, U. CHI. MAG. 7, 8 (Autumn 1976)). The
second and third aspects of privacy identified by Kurland are the categories men-
tioned in the text.
5 See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 ("[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra
where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion"). This interest has been
termed the "informational" or "confidential" privacy interest.
,.1, Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 ("This right of privacy... is broad enough to encom-
pass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."). In Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the Supreme Court stated that these autonomous de-
cisions pertain to "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, fam-
ily relationships, and child rearing and education. In these areas it has been held
that there are limitations on the States' power to substantively regulate conduct."
Id. at 713.
1-2 Hardwick v. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (White, J.) (refusing to
strike state sodomy statute on privacy grounds since "homosexual activity" has no
connection to the three categories of activity protected by the constitutional right
to privacy: family relationships, marriage, and procreation). See also Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry encompassed by right to privacy);
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking zoning ordinance which
allowed only members of a single "family" to reside together on right to privacy
grounds); Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (abortion encompassed by right to privacy); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to obtain contraception falls within right
to privacy); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (right to contraception falls within right to
privacy). But see Whalen, 429 U.S. at 589 (rights of prescription drug users in pre-
cluding the state from gathering information about their drug use not encom-
passed by right to privacy).
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thy of constitutional protection, appear to be afforded
lesser protection. 53 A court's choice of the applicable
standard of review is often the decisive factor in determin-
ing whether an alleged constitutional right to privacy has
been violated.
The Supreme Court has developed at least two different
standards of review to apply in substantive due process
cases. First, where the Court finds that a "fundamental"
right has been impaired by a statute, the Court applies a
standard that approaches strict scrutiny: the state's objec-
tive must be shown to be "compelling," and the relation
between the state's objective and the statutory means cho-
sen must be extremely close, so that the means can be said
to be "necessary" to effect that end. 54 Second, where the
Court has not deemed the right infringed upon as "funda-
mental," the Court applies a rational relation standard of
review: the state's objective must be shown to be merely
"legitimate," not "compelling," and the statutory means
chosen must bear a rational relation to the legitimate state
objective.1 55 The significance of the twofold standard of
review is crucial. Where the right infringed upon is non-
fundamental, the Court's extreme deference to the legis-
lative enactment is pervasive, resulting in virtually no
scrutiny at all. Where a fundamental right is beseiged,
very few statutes are sustained under the strict scrutiny
"5. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425,465 (1977) (Brennan,J.)
(recognizing that former President Nixon had a "legitimate expectation of privacy
in his personal communications" but rejecting Nixon's claim that the Presidential
Recordings and limited infringement under the Materials Preservation Act was
permissible); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06 (Stevens, J.) (implicitly recognizing that
individuals may have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in precluding
"unwarranted governmental disclosure of accumulated private data," but holding
that the New York State Controlled Substances Act did not violate any such right
to privacy).
1- Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Black-
mun, stated: "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has
held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling
state interest,' . . . and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to ex-
press only the legitimate state interests at stake." Id. (citations omitted).
, Whalen, 429 U.S. at 589; Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 731 (Black, J.) (stating that, in
the context of economic legislation, the Court "refuse[s] to sit as a 'superlegisla-
ture to weigh the wisdom of legislation.' ").
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standard employed by the Court. Because rights deemed
to be fundamental have often fallen within the autonomy
strand of privacy interests, 56 many regulations touching
upon these areas have been struck on substantive due
process grounds. Conversely, the interests within the in-
formational strand of privacy have less often been charac-
terized as fundamental; 57 thus, the Court's deferential
standard of review has typically resulted in validation of
statutes impinging upon informational privacy interests.
Roe v. Wade and Whalen v. Roe are illustrative of the
Supreme Court's application of the different standards of
review. In Roe v. Wade, the Court considered a constitu-
tional attack on Texas criminal abortion legislation. 158
The Court, speaking through Justice Blackmun, first de-
termined that a woman's decision "whether or not to ter-
minate her pregnancy" was a fundamental privacy right
worthy of constitutional protection under the "Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty."' 159 The
Court then recognized that this right of privacy was not
unqualified, and hence must be weighed against state in-
terests. 60 The Court then noted that the state had legiti-
mate interests both "in protecting the health of a
pregnant woman and in protecting the potentiality of
human life."' 6' At some point during the pregnancy, the
Court declared that these distinct, legitimate state inter-
-5 See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
157 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 589. But cf. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S.
301, 316-17 (1979) (holding that the NLRB abused its discretion by ordering an
employer to supply a labor union with copies of employee psychological aptitude
tests).
5, Roe, 410 U.S. at 116. The continued viability of Roe v. Wade, in the aftermath
of Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), is irrelevant for
purposes of this discussion, which examines Roe v. Wade only as illustrative of the
Supreme Court's application of the strict scrutiny standard of review. Of course,
this irrelevancy presumes that a Rehnquist Court, in overturning Roe v. Wade,
would not completely repudiate the constitutional right to privacy.
lso Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
-60 Id. at 154. The Court stated: "We, therefore, conclude that the right of
personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unquali-
fied and must be considered against important state interests in regulation." Id.
16' Id. at 162.
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ests become "compelling" enough to override the wo-
man's right of autonomy in making this important
decision. 162
In Whalen v. Roe, 163 a group of patients receiving pre-
scriptions for Schedule II drugs and the prescribing doc-
tors challenged the constitutionality of the New York
State Controlled Substances Act of 1972, which required
the recording of the names and addresses of all individu-
als who receive prescription drugs for which there is also
an unlawful market.' 64 The district court held that,
merely by requiring the recording of patients' names and
addresses, the statute impermissibly intruded upon the
doctor-patient relationship which is protected by the con-
stitutional right to privacy.' 65 In reversing the injunction
granted by the district court, the Supreme Court first
noted that Lochnerism' 66 had been rejected many times,
and that "[s]tate legislation which has some effect on indi-
vidual liberty or privacy may not be held unconstitutional
simply because a court finds it unnecessary, in whole or in
part."'' 67 The Court implicitly applied the rational rela-
tion standard of review to uphold the New York statute.
For example, the Court stated that the statute was "mani-
festly the product of an orderly and rational legislative de-
62 Id. at 162-63. In an extraordinarily precise constitutional holding, the Court
found that the state's interest in protecting the health of the pregnant woman did
not become "compelling" until the end of the first trimester of pregnancy; thus, a
woman's abortion decision must be "free of interference by the State" during the
first trimester. Id. at 163. With respect to the legitimate state interest in protect-
ing life, or at least the potentiality of life, the state's interest did not become
"compelling" until the fetus reached viability; thus, after viability, the Court
stated that the state "may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period,
except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. at
163-64.
1- 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
14 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591, 595. The names and addresses of the applicable
prescription drug users were recorded in a centralized computer file. Id. at 591.
The statute expressly prohibited public disclosure of the individuals' identities.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 595-96.
For a discussion of the Lochner decision see supra note 145.
-7 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597. The Court further stated that "[w]e have frequently
recognized that individual States have broad latitude in experimenting with possi-
ble solutions to problems of vital local concern." Id.
[57
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cision. '168 The Court then described the autonomical
and informational strands of privacy interests protected
generally by the Constitution and implicitly recognized
that the patient-identification portion of the statute
touched both strands of privacy;' 69 however, the Court
held that the statute did not "pose a sufficiently grievous
threat to either interest to establish a constitutional viola-
tion."' 170  In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan sug-
gested that the Court would resort to a strict scrutiny
standard of review if the statute purported to authorize
state officials to publicly disclose the information.'17
Roe v. Wade and Whalen v. Roe demonstrate that the
Supreme Court's willingness to strike a statute on consti-
tutional right to privacy grounds depends upon the stan-
dard of review employed by the Court. Furthermore, the
appropriate standard of review appears to be related to
the type of privacy interest implicated. The strict scrutiny
standard is typically used for analysis of fundamental, au-
tonomical privacy rights and the rational relation standard
is ordinarily used for analysis of non-fundamental, infor-
mational privacy rights.
- Id. (emphasis added). The Court further stated that the statute's "patient-
identification requirement was a reasonable exercise of New York's broad police
powers." Id. at 598. Unlike Roe v. Wade, nowhere in the Whalen v. Roe opinion
does the Court claim that New York had a "compelling" state objective.
-9 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600.
170 Id. at 600. The patients maintained that the recording of patient-identifica-
tion and the accompanying fear of public disclosure would make "some patients
reluctant to use, and some doctors reluctant to prescribe, such drugs even where
their use is medically indicated." Id. The patients claimed that their informa-
tional rights to privacy were impermissibly infringed upon by compelled disclo-
sure of private medical information. Id. They further claimed that this violated
their autonomical rights of privacy by negating their independence in making im-
portant personal health decisions. Id.
,71 Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated that "[b]road
dissemination by state officials of such information, however, would clearly impli-
cate constitutionally protected privacy rights, and would presumably be justified
only by compelling state interests." Id. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice
Stewart took issue with the implication in Brennan's concurrence that the Court
would recognize general, fundamental constitutional privacy rights outside of the
ordinary context, such as marriage, the home, and contraceptives. Id. at 607-09
(Stewart, J., concurring).
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2. The Constitutional Right to Privacy in a Medical or
Psychotherapeutical Context
Using the above generalized discussion of the Supreme
Court's treatment of the constitutional right to privacy as
a backdrop, this section examines cases in which the con-
stitutional right to privacy has been invoked in the context
of medical or psychotherapeutical records. From the out-
set, it should be noted that the privacy rights implicated in
such cases ordinarily fall within the "informational"
strand of privacy interests, rather than the "autonomical"
strand of privacy interests. Thus, courts have often em-
ployed the rational relation standard of review, rather
than the strict scrutiny standard.
a. Cases Favoring the Governmental Interest over the Privacy
Interest
In a number of decisions in the context of medical or
psychotherapeutical records, courts have found that a par-
ticular state action did not impermissibly infringe upon
the constitutional right to privacy. 72  In one of these
172 See, e.g., In re Search Warrant (Sealed), 810 F.2d 67 (3d Cir.) (holding that
seizure of medical records pursuant to a search warrant implicated the patients'
"informational" rights to privacy, but that these privacy interests were out-
weighed by the legitimate interests of the government in securing evidence
against the physician in an investigation for insurance fraud, especially since the
patients had diminished privacy interests by virtue of their submission of claims to
insurance companies), cert. denied sub nom. Rochman v. United States, 483 U.S.
1007 (1987); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983);
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding
that the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health's (NIOSH) solicita-
tion of a company's employees' medical records implicated the employees' consti-
tutional rights to privacy, but that these privacy interests were outweighed by
NIOSH's interest in investigating employees' exposure to hazardous chemicals);
Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that commu-
nications between psychotherapist and patient fall within the ambit of fundamen-
tal, constitutionally protected privacy rights but that the compelling state interest
of insuring that the "truth is ascertained in legal proceedings in its courts of law"
outweighs the privacy right), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977); United States v.
Colletta, 602 F. Supp. 1322, 1327 (E.D. Pa.) (in case where defendant doctor was
accused of defrauding insurance companies, court first stated that no general phy-
sician-patient privilege exists at federal common law and then held that the state's
interest in deterring mail fraud outweighed the patients' constitutional privacy
interests), aff'd mem., 770 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1985); Miller v. Colonial Refrigerated
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cases, In re Zuniga,173 a psychiatrist under investigation for
a scheme to defraud an insurance company refused to
comply with a subpoena duces tecum requesting some of
his patients' files. The psychiatrist's refusal was based on
the grounds that the documents were protected from dis-
closure by the psychotherapist-patient privilege and by his
patients' constitutional right to privacy. 174 The court first
stated that even if such a privacy right existed, it would
not be absolute. 175 As in Whalen v. Roe, 1 7 6 the court noted
that modern medical procedures, which involve disclo-
sures of private medical information not only to doctors
but also to insurance companies and public health agen-
cies, result in a patient's diminished privacy interest.' 77
Citing Whalen v. Roe, the court then balanced the limited
privacy intrusion against the state's legitimate interest at-
tending a grand jury's proceedings." 78
Transp. Inc., 81 F.R.D. 741 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (in action to recover damages for
posttraumatic neurosis, court held that even if a psychotherapist-patient privilege
protected by the constitutional right to privacy was deemed to exist, it must suc-
cumb to the legitimate state interest in obtaining truth and fairness in adversarial
legal proceedings); Lora v. Board of Educ. 74 F.R.D. 565, 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(where plaintiffs alleged that school district identified emotionally handicapped
children in a racially discriminatory manner and sought production of anonymous
psychotherapeutical records, the court held that both the students' constitutional
rights to privacy and the psychotherapist-patient privileges must be considered,
but that the "legitimate and weighty competing private and state interests" out-
weighed the privacy interests and privileges); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Finklea, 442 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. W.Va. 1977) (upholding NIOSH's subpoena du-
ces tecum for plaintiff's employees' medical records over a constitutional right to
privacy assertion given the legitimate interest of NIOSH in investigating unusually
high cancer rates among the employees); Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66,
450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (holding that Chapman, John Lennon's
assassin, did not have a constitutional right to privacy broad enough to preclude
the state's prevention of Chapman's attempted suicide by starvation).
1. 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983).
,74 Id. at 634-36. For discussion of the Zuniga court's recognition of the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege, see supra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
175 Zunga, 714 F.2d at 641.
176 429 U.S. 589 (1977). For discussion of Whalen v. Roe, see supra notes 163-71
and accompanying text.
'77 Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 641. The court reiterated that "a person possesses no
reasonable expectation that his medical history will remain completely confidential."
Id. (emphasis in original).
'78 Id. at 641-42. The court stated:
Furthermore, the information sought will be protected by the veil of
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In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a
subpoena duces tecum issued by an administrative agency
over a claim of constitutional right to privacy. 80 In West-
inghouse, the NIOSH received a request for a health hazard
evaluation from a Westinghouse employee."" Following
a plant visit, NIOSH physicians solicited access to medical
records of those employees working in a potentially haz-
ardous area. 182 After Westinghouse's initial rebuff of the
voluntary request for the records, the Director of NIOSH
issued a subpoena duces tecum to Westinghouse's custo-
dian of records, but Westinghouse again refused to pro-
duce the records.' 8 3 Upon NIOSH's filing of an action,
the district court ordered full enforcement of the sub-
poena, rejecting Westinghouse's assertion that the infor-
mation was protected from disclosure by physician-
patient privileges or by the employees' constitutional
rights to privacy. 84
On appeal, the Third Circuit characterized the privacy
interest implicated as falling within the "informational"
strand of privacy interests, "the right not to have an indi-
vidual's private affairs made public by the govern-
ment."' 85 The court then declared that NIOSH could
secrecy attending grand jury proceedings. Accordingly .... the in-
formation will be disclosed only to the minimal extent necessary to
promote a proper governmental interest .... In sum, weighing the
slight intrusion on the patients' privacy interest against the need for
the grand jury to conduct an effective and comprehensive investiga-
tion into alleged violation of the law, the Court concludes that en-
forcement of the subpoenas does not unconstitutionally infringe on
the rights of the patients.
Id. at 642.
11 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
180 Id. at 580.
Id. at 572. NIOSH was established by the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 to establish occupational safety and health guidelines and to conduct




' ld. at 577. The court stated that "[t]here can be no question that an em-
ployee's medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature,
are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protections." Id. For a
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intrude into this zone of privacy only upon a showing that
the "societal interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy
interest on the specific facts of the case."'' 86 The court
performed the balancing test by considering a number of
factors. 18 7 These factors included the interest of Westing-
house employees and the public at large in occupational
safety and health; the merely private, rather than ex-
tremely sensitive nature of the materials; and NIOSH's
procedures to prevent unauthorized disclosure. 88 The
court concluded that legitimate public interests of NIOSH
outweighed the minor encroachment upon the employ-
ees' privacy interest. 189
As Westinghouse and Zuniga demonstrate, courts ostensi-
bly recognizing a constitutional right to privacy in the
context of medical or psychotherapeutical records have
often followed the example of Whalen v. Roe in permitting
merely legitimate, rather than compelling, governmental
interests to prevail over privacy interests.
b. Cases Favoring the Privacy Interest over the Governmental
Interest
On the other hand, a few courts have determined that a
discussion of the "informational" strand of privacy interests, see supra note 150
and accompanying text.
186 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
'- Id. at 578-80. The Third Circuit proposed that the following factors should
be considered in the balancing test:
The factors which should be considered in deciding whether an in-
trusion into an individual's privacy is justified are the type of record
requested, the information it does or might contain, the potential for
harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, the injury from
disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated, the
adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the de-
gree of need for access, and whether there is an express statutory
mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public in-
terest militating toward access.
Id. at 578.
'" Id. at 579-80.
-9 Id. at 580. Recognizing that some of Westinghouse's employees might feel
that their medical records might contain especially sensitive information, the
court required NIOSH to notify the employees whose medical records would be
examined in order to permit such employees to assert their own privacy claims.
Id. at 580-81.
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particular state action impermissibly infringed upon the
constitutional right to privacy in the medical or
psychotherapeutical context. Hawaii Psychiatric Society v.
Ariyoshi'90 involved a Hawaii Medicaid fraud statute which
authorized the issuance of administrative inspection war-
rants upon a showing of probable cause. A warrant was
issued authorizing the search and seizure of a licensed
clinical psychologist's records relating to Medicaid benefi-
ciaries.' 9 The court issued a preliminary injunction upon
a finding that there was a substantial probability that the
psychotherapist would prevail on the claim that the stat-
ute violated patients' constitutional rights to privacy. 92
In NTSB v. Hollywood Memorial Hospital, 93 Root, the
"mystery" pilot, moved in the district court to quash the
NTSB's subpoena of his post-crash psychiatric evaluation
on the grounds, in part, that enforcement of the subpoena
would violate his constitutional right to privacy. The
court first categorized the interest that Root sought to
protect as falling within the informational strand of con-
stitutional privacy interests. 94 The court then asserted
that Root's privacy right must be balanced against the le-
gitimate state interests of the NTSB in investigating air
accidents. 95 Before performing this balancing test, the
court turned its attention to a justification of a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege, apparently attaching constitu-
tional significance to the privilege.' 96 With considerable
- 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Haw. 1979).
1, Id. at 1034.
,92 Id. at 1052.
,9- 735 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Fla. 1990), appeal dismissed, 933 F.2d 1021 (11 th Cir.
1991). For the factual history of the case, see supra notes 1-13 and accompanying
text. For discussion of the court's analysis of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
issue, see supra notes 120-32 and accompanying text.
,94 Hollywood Memorial Hosp., 735 F. Supp. at 424. The court declared that
"[t]he constitutional right to privacy extends to the individual interest in avoiding
the disclosure of personal matters, and medical or psychiatric records fall within
that sphere." Id.
19.1 Id. The NTSB claimed that it needed to know Root's mental condition in
order to satisfactorily perform its statutory duty to ascertain the probable cause of
the air accident. Id.
1 Id. at 424-25.
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discussion of Root's privacy interest in his psychiatric
records but very little discussion of the NTSB's interests,
the court, in conclusory fashion, held that the governmen-
tal interest did not survive the balancing test. 197
These cases reveal that a few courts have used more
than the rational relation standard of review to analyze
cases implicating the informational strand of the constitu-
tional right to privacy despite the refusal of the Supreme
Court to require more than a rational relation in Whalen v.
Roe. ' In Hawaii Psychiatric, the court framed its inquiry
in terms of whether the statute "burdens the individual's
liberty to make decisions regarding psychiatric care, and,
if so, whether the state has demonstrated that the statutue
represents the least restrictive means to achieve a compel-
ling state interest."' 99  In Hollywood Memorial Hospital,
however, the court clearly failed to identify and develop
the legitimate public interests served in facilitating accu-
rate investigatory procedures by the NTSB; thus, the
court "easily" concluded that the balance tipped in favor
of the constitutional right to privacy. The Westinghouse de-
cision stands in stark contrast to Hollywood Memorial Hospi-
tal. In Westinghouse, the court at least elucidated the
factors that it considered important in the balancing test
before deciding whether NIOSH had asserted a legitimate
interest that outweighed the privacy interest. Neverthe-
less, the standard of review employed by a court again
seemed to be the dispositive factor in deciding whether
the governmental interest should prevail.
19, Id. at 425. The court declared that "[a] balancing of Root's right against
that of the [NTSB] and the public interest demonstrates that Root's privilege has
not been overcome." Id. The significance of this statement is that since the pub-
lic interest did not overcome Root's privilege, rather than Root's constitutional
right to privacy, the court must have meant that the NTSB did not assert a "com-
pelling" governmental interest, rather than merely a "legitimate" state interest.
The court thus gave Root's psychiatric records greater protection under the com-
mon law based psychotherapist-patient privilege than even the constitutional right
to privacy would have afforded.
See supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
481 F. Supp. at 1039.
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3. The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of
NTSB Air Accident Investigations
NTSB v. Hollywood Memorial Hospital 20 0 appears to be the
first published opinion resolving a claim that an NTSB in-
vestigation infringed upon an individual's constitutional
right to privacy. Unfortunately, the court, in its brief, two-
page opinion, dealt with the issue in a perfunctory man-
ner. The court also blended its analysis of the right to
privacy with its analysis of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, resulting in a holding that can be interpreted in
at least three ways: (1) Root's post-crash psychiatric
records are protected from the NTSB's subpoena by a
psychotherapist-patient privilege at federal common law;
(2) the records are protected by Root's constitutional
right to privacy; or (3) the records are protected by a psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege flowing from Root's consti-
tutional right to privacy.
At least with regard to the portion of the holding based
upon the constitutional right to privacy, this comment ad-
vances the following analysis as more closely approaching
that mandated by the Supreme Court's privacy decisions.
First, a court should acknowledge that the Supreme Court
has recognized at least two types of privacy interests os-
tensibly protected by the constitution, an informational
privacy interest and an autonomical privacy interest. Pro-
tection of the autonomical interest, an individual's liberty
to make certain types of important decisions, has been re-
stricted to only a few contexts, such as family relation-
ships, marriage, and procreation. Only when this interest
is implicated has the Court resorted to the strict scrutiny
("compelling state interest") standard of review. When
the informational privacy interest, an individual's interest
in precluding the government from disclosing private,
personal matters, is asserted, the Court has used the def-
erential, rational relation standard of review, requiring
2- 735 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Fla. 1990), appeal dismissed, 933 F.2d 1021 (11 th Cir.
1991). See supra notes 1-13, 120-29, and 193-97 and accompanying text.
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only that the government maintain a legitimate interest
that outweighs the privacy interest. In the NTSB context,
where a pilot is asserting that his psychotherapeutical
records are protected by the constitutional right to pri-
vacy, a court should immediately recognize that the infor-
mational privacy interest has been asserted and that the
balancing test is applicable. The approach taken by the
Hollywood Memorial Hospital court conforms with the analy-
sis to this point.2 '
A court should next describe the factors considered
crucial to the balancing equation. The court in Westing-
house compiled an impressive list of factors to consider
when performing the balancing test.20 2 Applying these
factors to the facts of Hollywood Memorial Hospital is an in-
teresting exercise. The type of record requested by the
NTSB was a psychiatric record. A court should also con-
sider the harm to Root that would result from a noncon-
sensual disclosure of the information as well as the injury
to the psychotherapist-patient relationship. A court
should take practical notice of the press accounts of the
numerous criminal charges lodged against Root as well as
the fact that Root had presumably never even met the psy-
chotherapist until after the crash and the slim likelihood
of a continued relationship with a psychotherapist in
Hollywood, Florida since Root lived in the Washington,
D.C. area. A court should not overlook the safeguards
utilized by the NTSB to prevent unauthorized disclosure,
particularly since the NTSB is subject to the Privacy Act of
1974.203 Finally, a court should note that NTSB is under
an express statutory mandate to investigate all air acci-
dents in order to determine probable cause of the acci-
dent. The public policy behind the creation of the NTSB,
20, 735 F. Supp. at 424. "The constitutional right to privacy extends to the
individual interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters, and medical or
psychiatric records fall within that sphere. Again, the privacy right must be bal-
anced against legitimate state interests in order to protect the communications,
etc." Id. (citations omitted).
202 See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
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including the promotion of air safety, manifests the public
interest militating toward access. This comment suggests
that a court carefully analyzing these factors is likely to
hold that the NTSB has asserted a legitimate state interest
that outweighed Root's diminished privacy interest. Re-
gardless of the conclusion that a court reaches, a court
owes an obligation to at least express the factors that it
considered, unlike the court in Hollywood Memorial
Hospital.
V. CONCLUSION
In the course of an NTSB air accident investigation, the
NTSB's request for documents occasionally includes the
psychotherapeutical records of the flight crew, particu-
larly the pilot. In such a case, the pilot might refuse to
relinquish the records on the grounds that the records are
protected by a psychotherapist-patient privilege or the
constitutional right to privacy. This comment has demon-
strated that most courts have refused to recognize a fed-
eral psychotherapist-patient privilege. The right to
privacy implicated here is the informational right to pri-
vacy. Regardless of whether a court recognizes that the
privilege exists or that a pilot's right to privacy is properly
asserted, the court determining whether to enforce the
NTSB's administrative subpoena is likely to apply the
same balancing test: whether the NTSB has asserted a le-
gitimate governmental interest that outweighs the individ-
ual's right to privacy or the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. Although application of the balancing test will
differ depending upon the actual facts, many factors mili-
tate in favor of the NTSB's legitimate interest in investi-
gating air accidents.
